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Introduction
PROTECTING COASTAL AND ESTUARINE RESOURCESCONFRONTING THE GULF BETWEEN
THE PROMISE AND PRODUCT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly two decades ago our Nation launched a public law
revolution to protect the environment.' Despite some winning battles, victory over pollution remains an elusive goal. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the Nation's coastal and estuarine waters. 2
Toxic pollution and excessive nutrient loadings have severely damaged the aquatic resources of the Chesapeake Bay-the Nation's
largest and most productive estuary.- Throughout the country the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., Macalester College, 1972; M.A., Stanford University, 1978; J.D., Stanford Law School,
1978.
I. The explosive growth of federal environmental law began with the enactment of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp.
111 1985). Other major environmental legislation followed in rapid succession including
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. 111 1985), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp.
1I1 1985), in 1972; the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), in 1976; and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response. Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 &
Supp. II 1985), in 1980.
2. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(testimony of George R. Hampson); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WASTES IN
MARINE ENVIRONMENTS (1987); Efforts to Combat Marine Pollution Not Keeping Pace with
Growth. State Group Told, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1934 (Dec. 18, 1987); Reinhold,
Invasion of Trash from Sea Overwhelming, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
3. There are numerous indicators that document the decline of aquatic life in the
Chesapeake Bay. Because of the drastic decline in commercial finfish harvests, the
striped bass fishery has been closed. Shellfish harvests remain at all-time lows and submerged aquatic vegetation has declined precipitously since the 1960s. CHESAPEAKE ExECUTIVE

COUNCIL, SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT UNDER THE CHESAPEAKE BAY

AGREEMENT 8-19 (Feb. 1987). The Chesapeake's oyster beds have been devastated by
pollution and disease (MSX and dermo). In Maryland alone, the harvest of oysters has
declined from as much as 15 million bushels a year in the nineteenth century to less than
halfa million bushels. Greer, Difficult Harvest: Maryland's Oyster Fishery, 8 MO. SEA GRANT
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declining quality of coastal and estuarine areas is reflected in the
closings of contaminated beaches4 and shellfish beds, 5 fish kills, and
discoveries of growing areas of oxygen-depleted waters. 6 This rapid
destruction of resources has forced a fundamental re-examination of
past policies as new and more ambitious preservation initiatives are
developed. 7
This issue of the Maryland Law Review focuses on the difficult
issues raised by efforts to protect coastal and estuarine resources.
Although attempts to protect these resources are nearly two decades old,' such efforts have intensified in recent years. For example, last year Congress reauthorized the Clean Water Act with new,
more stringent directives for protecting the Nation's waters. 9 Congress also enacted legislation banning the disposal of plastic materials by vessels at sea.' 0 Additionally, Maryland, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency strengthened their historic Chesapeake Bay
Agreement, pledging to implement more comprehensive measures
to protect the Bay.II Furthermore, other states embarked on ambitious initiatives to clean up coastal waters and to protect valuable
1 (1987); Boosting Oysters Could Help Clean Bay, Biologist Says. The Sun (Baltimore), Apr. 1,
1988, at B3, col. 1.
4. See Waterways, Declining, Focus of Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1988, at BI, col. 2.
5. See State Closes Most Clam, Oyster Beds Due to Rain, and Disease Reports Hurt Maryland's Oyster Market, Waterman's Gazette, Dec. 1987, at 1, cols. I & 2.
6. See, e.g., Even Ecologists Don 't Always Know, The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 15, 1987, at
13A, col. 1; Dead Water on the Chesapeake, MD. MARINE NoTEs 1 (Aug. 1987).
7. Roemer Wins GubernatorialElection, PromisesAction on Pollution, Erosion, 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 28, at 1711 (Nov. 6, 1987); Diverse Forum Will Work at EPA's Request to Recommend Better Ways to Protect Wetlands, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 855 (July 24, 1987).
8. The importance of protecting the Nation's waters and coastal resources was recognized by Congress in 1972 when it enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act (Ocean Dumping Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982).
9. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (to be codified at
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). When it amended the Clean Water Act, Congress recognized the importance of maintaining the health and ecological integrity of the Nation's estuaries in the face of the increased threats facing them. See H.R. REP. 1004, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1986). The new amendments establish a National Estuary Program
authorizing the convening of interstate and international management conferences to
develop comprehensive plans for protecting estuaries, including Long Island Sound,
Narragansett Bay, Buzzards Bay, Puget Sound, New York-NewJersey Harbor, Delaware
Bay, Delaware Inland Bays, Albemarle Sound, Sarasota Bay, San Francisco Bay, and Galveston Bay. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 320(a)(2)(B), 101 Stat. 6,
62 (1987) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1330(a)(2)(B)).
10. Act of Dec. 29, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-220, 101 Stat. 1458.
1I. 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (Dec. 14, 1987) (available at the Maryland Law
Review).
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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SYMPOSIUM

The articles that follow are products of a National Environmental Symposium on the Chesapeake Bay, sponsored last fall by the
Maryland Law Review at the University of Maryland School of Law.
The Symposium marked the establishment of the University of
Maryland's new, interdisciplinary environmental program-the
Chesapeake Coastal and Estuarine Policy Program.'"
Because protection of coastal and estuarine resources is a multidisciplinary challenge, speakers at the National Environmental
Symposium included experts in science, law, economics, philosophy, and communications. The articles in this issue of the Maryland
Law Review reflect this multidisciplinary perspective. They include
contributions from a law professor, a journalist, an environmental
lawyer, three scientists, and an economist.
Oliver Houck opens with a critical reflection on why current
laws have not stemmed the destruction of coastal and estuarine resources. Professor Houck, who teaches environmental law at Tulane Law School, chronicles the impact of relentless development
pressures on the Nation's coastal and wetland areas. He concludes
that these pressures have simply overwhelmed the regulatory system, and fundamentally new approaches are needed if there is to be
any hope for saving America's coastal zone.
Next, Thomas Horton discusses the difficult challenge of reversing the decline of the Chesapeake Bay. As a veteran environmental reporter for the Baltimore Sun, Mr. Horton has long witnessed
the development of environmental policy in the Chesapeake region.
His recently released book, Bay Country,' 4 has confirmed his reputation as one of the Nation's finest environmental journalists. Currently on leave from the Sun, Mr. Horton directs the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation's Smith Island Educational Center.
12. Ten Million Dollar Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund Created by Bill Signed by Connecticut
Governor, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1I, at 777 (July 10, 1987). NewJersey, for example,
enacted legislation that protects 323,000 acres of wetlands from development. See Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-1 to -49 (West 1987).
13. The Chesapeake Coastal and Estuarine Policy Program is a joint venture between the Law School, the Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies, and the
School of Public Affairs. The program combines faculty and students from the three
schools in interdisciplinary research, education, and public service on the problems facing the region's unique coastal and estuarine resources, including the Chesapeake Bay,
the Nation's largest estuary.
14. T. HORTON, BAY COUNTRY (1987).
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James Tripp and Michael Oppenheimer discuss Specific steps
that can be taken to reduce nutrient loadings and to protect wetland
areas in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Mr. Tripp, who is general
counsel of the Environmental Defense Fund, has been a principal
architect of legal strategies for protecting wetlands. Dr. Oppenheimer, an atmospheric physicist, reveals new data on the impact of
atmospheric pollution on nutrient levels in the Chesapeake Bay.
Alan Krupnick, an economist with Resources for the Future,
discusses the economics of measures to control nutrient enrichment
of the Chesapeake Bay. Dr. Krupnick's study focuses on the new
commitment by the Chesapeake Bay states to achieve at least a 40
percent reduction of nitrogen and phosphorus entering the Bay by
the year 2000. He explores the difficulties confronting efforts to assess whether the target is an appropriate one and to determine the
most efficient way to allocate nutrient reductions among sources.
Ian Morris, director of the University of Maryland's Center for
Environmental and Estuarine Studies, and his assistant, Dr. Wayne
Bell, end the Symposium with an international perspective on the
"Save the Bay" movement. Dr. Morris serves as chairman of the
Coastal Seas Governance Project, a comparative, international study
of efforts to protect coastal and estuarine waters. The authors discuss the preliminary findings of this project and their implications
for protection of coastal and estuarine areas in the United States.
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:

THE GULF BETWEEN PROMISE

AND PRODUCT

The authors appear profoundly pessimistic about the prospects
for reversing generations of environmental damage. Oliver Houck
questions whether resources are disappearing so rapidly that we
may not have the technological, economic, or political capacity to
save them. 5 Thomas Horton's most optimistic prognosis is for winning battles in a losing war.' 6 James Tripp complains of a legal system that is far more effective at protecting private use of land than
in preventing destruction of the natural environment.' 7
As the authors recognize, enormous efforts have been made to
protect coastal and estuarine areas. Yet, as Thomas Horton
15. Houck, Ending the 11'ar: .4 Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REv.
358, 358 (1988).
16. Horton, Protection of the Chesapeake Bay: Environmentallv Legal. Eminently Uninhabitable?, 47 MD. L. REv. 406, 414-16 (1988).
17. Tripp & Oppenheimer, Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay A Multi-State Institutional
Challenge, 47 MD. L. REv. 425, 448-50 (1988).
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predicts, these efforts may succeed only in providing us with an environment that is "legally sufficient" though "increasingly less
pleasant."' 8 Oliver Houck goes further and concludes that the regulatory system has simply been asked to do too much; it is incapable,
by itself, of overcoming enormous economic and political pressures
favoring development. ' 9
The authors' observations reflect a chronic complaint of students of environmental policy: the gulf between the laws' promise
and the results actually achieved by environmental regulation. Despite the explosive growth of environmental regulation in recent
years, an enormous disparity remains between the environmental
standards articulated in our laws and the actual quality of the environment. Certainly the Nation's environment iscleaner and safer
than it would be without such laws, but environmental results consistently have fallen far short of the laws' ambitious rhetoric. Why
has this happened? Are the laws too ambitious? Has the-effort to
implement them been too half-hearted? Or have regulators simply
been using the wrong approach?
James Tripp suggests that part of the problem lies with the implementation of the laws. In addition to implementing ambitious
new land use controls, like those mandated by Maryland's Critical
Area Law, 20 new measures to protect wetlands and to reduce nutrient loadings (such as an advanced identification program for wetlands or numerical water quality standards for nutrients) can be
imposed under the authority of existing laws, such as the Clean
Water Act. Regulators need to be more aggressive and more creative in using their existing authority.
Oliver Houck agrees that there is much more that could be
done using existing regulatory authority. He suggests, however,
that the more fundamental problem is that existing regulatory programs have been expected to do too much by themselves. Until the
economic and political forces powering the development of coastal
areas are confronted directly through national prohibitions on
coastal development, the regulatory system can do little more than
slow the destruction.
Thomas Horton stresses the difficulty reconciling differences
between individual and societal goals. Everyone wants to save the
Bay, but no one wants to bear the brunt of environmental controls.
18. Horton, supra note 16, at 406.
19. Houck, supra note 15, at 358.
20. Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program, MD.
§§ 8-1801 to -1816 (Supp.1987).

NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
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For example, Horton describes the testimony of a real estate agent
opposing Maryland's Critical Areas legislation who stressed the
need to save the Chesapeake Bay so that more people would move
to the region. 2 Similar tales often are told about Chesapeake
watermen deploring the depleted state of the public fishery, while
vowing to compete to be the one to harvest the last oyster.
These observations illustrate some of the fundamental reasons
why America's environmental revolution has not achieved more effective environmental results. Policymakers rarely have been successful in predicting and preventing environmental problems before
they occur; instead they have concentrated on the more difficult and
expensive task of cleaning up after damage has been done. Public
demands for environmental protection have produced comprehensive statutory protections that have not been translated into effective
regulatory programs. Efforts to develop new, more effective regulatory approaches have been frustrated by both opponents and proponents of environmental regulation.
A.

The Tardiness of Preventive Regulation

The Symposium last fall and the subsequent signing of a new
Chesapeake Bay Agreement reflect an extraordinary consensus in
favor of stronger measures to protect the Chesapeake Bay. Public
opinion polls show strong public support for tougher environmental regulations, even when people are reminded that it may cost
them money. 2 2 No one doubts that the public values the Nation's
coasts and estuaries and wants to save them. But what is difficult to
understand is why it takes so long to respond to environmental
threats. Why did public policy not respond more rapidly to the decline of the Chesapeake Bay as vast areas of underwater vegetation
disappeared, shellfish production was devastated, and the popular
striped bass fishery was pushed to the brink-all in the shadow of
the Nation's capital?
The agents of environmental damage always are easier to identify after the damage has been done. Scientific predictions are made
more confidently after experiments have been performed, and nature too often is humanity's laboratory.
Yet the decline of the Chesapeake did not happen without
21. Horton, supra note 16, at 415.
22. See, e.g., NATIONAL CLEAN AIR COALITION, THE
porting Louis Harris

survey);

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES:

CLEAN AIR

ACT 7-10 (1985) (re-

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, PUBLIC OPINION ON

RESULTS OF A NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY

(1980).
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warning. As Thomas Horton notes, major "Save the Bay" conferences were held in 1968 and 1977, and they ended with enthusiastic
support for measures to prevent pollution of this precious estuary.2 3
Warnings about depletion of the Chesapeake's resources were
heard even at the turn of the century. 24 Yet these warnings were not
heeded.
Ian Morris' international study confirms the importance of a
major "event" to galvanize public demand to protect coastal resources. 25 Such "events" often are acute incidents of severe environmental damage. 26 Thus, environmental policy more frequently
is shaped by incidents of acute, high-level environmental damage
than by damage from chronic exposures to lower levels of harmful
pollutants.27
Environmental policy's "early warning system" leaves much to
be desired.' Citizens respond swiftly (and often hysterically) after
their neighborhood is contaminated. While it is easy to focus public
concern on demands for cleanup, it is more difficult to generate sustained public pressure for preventive measures. Environmental policy lurches from one crisis to another, grappling with the difficult
and expensive task of cleaning up damage after it has been done
more frequently than shaping preventive policies. 8
23. Horton, supra note 16, at 415. See also Eichbaum, The Chesapeake Bay: Major Research Program Leads to Innovative Implementation, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,237,
10,240 (1984). A report in 1968 warned of evidence that the Bay was approaching the
-critical point" where it was becoming "too rich in nutrients." REGIONAL PLANNING
COUNCIL, A RECONNAISSANCE

STUDY OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, at xi (1968). In 1977,
another report noted that since 1916 at least 50 reports about the Bay and Baltimore
Harbor had been prepared; although many agreed on the conclusions about the nature
of the problems, only a few of the several proposals had been implemented. CITIZENS
LEAGUE OF BALTIMORE, THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND THE PORT OF BALTIMORE:

IT Is TIME

To MANAGE THE BAY As A TOTAL UNIT AND THEREBY GUARANTEE THE PORT'S ExISTENCE
7 (1977).
24. See W.K. BROOKS, THE OYSTER (2d ed. 1905) (urging better maintenance of oyster beds and water resources in Maryland). For a comprehensive history of the politics
of pollution control concerns with respect to the Chesapeake, seeJ. CAPPER, G. POWER &
F.R. SHIVERS, CHESAPEAKE WATERS: POLLUTION, PUBLIC HEALTH & PUBLIC OPINION
1607-1972 (1983).
25. Morris & Bell, Coastal Seas Governance.- An InternationalProjectfor Management Policy
on Threatened Coastal Seas, 47 MD. L. REV. 481, 487 (1988).
26. Id.
27. See Silbergeld & Percival, The Organometas: Impact of Accidental Exposure and Experimental Data on Regulatory Policies, in NEUROTOXICANTS AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FUNCTION:
EFFECTS OF ORGANOHEAVY METALS 328, 347 (H. Tilson & S. Sparber eds. 1987).
28. This is illustrated most dramatically by the size of the $8.5 billion Superfund
program, recently supplemented by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, which is designed to remediate contamination by toxic waste. It has been estimated that the eventual cost of this program will
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Environmental policy must always be made in the face of sub-

stantial uncertainties. Even after environmental damage has become painfully apparent, its causes, sources, and subsequent impact
often are incompletely understood, particularly when the damage is

done to a tremendously complicated ecosystem. Yet one can easily
question whether damage to the Chesapeake Bay would have been
prevented had policymakers known twenty years ago what they
know today. Policymakers' insatiable appetite for information often

can provide a ready excuse for deferring difficult regulatory decisions in favor of additional study--even though research rarely can
dispel all important uncertainties. 29 As a result, regulatory policy
often is biased toward minimizing .costs in the short run, creating
substantial environmental burdens for future generations.
B.

A "Victorian Compromise" in Environmental Policy?

Laws on the books promise the public comprehensive environmental protections: the elimination of pollutant discharges. in surface waters,30 protection from "any known or anticipated adverse
effects" of air pollution, 3 "adequate" or "ample" margins of safety
against *conventional and hazardous air pollutants, 2 and proper
control of hazardous waste from "cradle to grave." 3 3 The gulf between these ambitious promises and the reality of environmental
damage suggests that the laws actually may perform a function very
different from that formally articulated in the law books. They may

function in a manner akin to what Lawrence Friedman has described
be $100 billion over the next 50 years. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND
STRATEGY 3 (1986). This is far more than will be spent on governmental programs to

prevent hazardous waste mismanagement under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Because it is so expensive to
remedy environmental damage after it has occurred, some are questioning whether, in
many instances, it is even worth it to try. See Toxic Cleanup Plan Moves Slowly Amid Criticism
from Two Fronts, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1988, at 20, col. i. These critics apparently ignore
the impact of relaxing cleanup standards on incentives to prevent future contamination.
29. See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards
and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1283-84 (1985). In 1969 it
was reported that more than 1450 studies had been made of the Chesapeake Bay and
that the Bay "experts agree, is the most thoroughly studied tidewater estuary in the
world." The Bay was described as "being slowly strangled in a morass of 'paper pollution' as well as water pollution." Mills, A Morass of Red Tape Is StranglingSolution of Vater
Pollution Problem, reprinted in THE CHESAPEAKE AT BAY 36 (W. Perkinson, B. Burton & D.
Mills eds. 1969).
30. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
31. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1982).
32. Id. § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982).
33. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 1003(4), 42 U.S.C. 6902(4)
(1982).
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as the "Victorian compromise" that prevailed in late nineteenthcentury America. s4
In the late Victorian era, American laws prohibited a variety of
conduct on moral grounds, even though officials quietly tolerated
such behavior. So long as forbidden behavior remained hidden, it
of enforcing
did not openly threaten moral norms, and the 3notion
5
the official moral code was not taken seriously.
Like the tough, moral laws of nineteenth-century America that
promised citizens an environment free of vice and immorality, contemporary environmental laws are "laws with a strong, healthy ethical surface."3 6 They reassure the public that their environment will
be clean and healthy because the law has declared that it must be.
Drinking water will be *safe to drink, s" rivers will be fishable and
swimmable,3 " and the environment will be free from noise that jeopardizes health or welfare.3 9 These promises occasionally are qualified by words tucked into the statutory fine print, like "wherever
attainable" 4 or "to the extent feasible."'" But the laws generally
convey to the public that they and their environment will enjoy the
most. comprehensive protections possible.
Perhaps this explains the great fanfare that accompanies the
launching of each new environmental initiative.4" It serves to reassure the public that they are protected; laws have been enacted that
will take care of the problem if they are patient. Lost in the excitement is the disquieting reality that each new initiative was necessary
34. See L.

FRIEDMAN,

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 585 (2d ed. 1985) (defining the

Victorian compromise as "a certain toleration for vice, or at least a resigned acceptance,
so long as it [remains] in an underground state").
35. See Friedman, Notes Toward a History of American justice, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. II I.
119-20 (1974).
36.
37.
38.
39.
that it

Id. at 120.
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f to 300y-10 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982).
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (1982) ("The Congress declares
is the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all Americans

free from noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare.").
40. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982).
41. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
42. For example, when a new Chesapeake Bay Agreement was signed recently, an
elaborate public ceremony was held, and thousands of citizens were sent printed invitations. The signing ceremony was held in a huge auditorium and was accompanied by
the performance of marching bands. The "historic agreement" was widely hailed, and
officials basked in the favorable publicity it drew. Shortly after the signing ceremony,
the Governors of Maryland and Delaware met in another "historic" meeting at which
Delaware officials volunteered to join the Chesapeake Bay Agreement. Maryland, Del.
Leaders Agree to Joint Effort to Clean Bay, The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 6, 1988, at 3G. col. I.
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because the problems have gotten worse.4"
The relationship between law and social behavior is one of extraordinary complexity." Yet it is difficult to understand why our
legal system has not translated broad public support and strong
legal directives into more effective environmental regulation.
The "Victorian compromise" may reflect that it is easier to pass
laws prohibiting evils-like vice and pollution-than it is to appropriate the resources necessary to combat them. And it is easier to
appropriate funds to combat such generalized evil than it is to know
how to spend such funds wisely and effectively.
To ensure that administrative agencies perform their regulatory
responsibilities, the environmental laws provide substantial opportunities for public participation in the development and enforcement of regulations. Public participation in rulemaking proceedings
is guaranteed by law 45 and expressly encouraged by official policy.4 6
Most federal laws also authorize citizen suits against those who violate environmental regulations."

Thus, unlike nineteenth-century

43. The day before the signing ceremony for the new Chesapeake Bay Agreement,
officials were embarrassed by the release of the results of toxicity tests performed on the
effluents of major companies discharging into the Bay. Offcials Are Surprised by lVastes
Found in Bay, The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 14, 1987, at I, col. 6. The results
showed toxicity problems in virtually all such discharges. The following day, a political
cartoon appeared showing federal and state officials gathered for the signing ceremony
next to a pipe discharging toxic wastes. The caption on the cartoon was: "'This Is Embarrassing-We'll Have It Looked Into Immediately." The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 15,
1987, at 12A, col. 3. One columnist, a distinct minority, questioned the reason for all
the official back-slapping, noting that where he lived on the Bay, ducks, aquatic grass,
oysters, and rockfish continue to disappear rapidly. Phillips, WI'hile Politicians Cheer Their
Actions, Chesapeake Is Dyingfrom Inaction, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1988, at E2, col. I.
44. One of the best explorations of the complex relationship between law and social
behavior is L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975).
45. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes citizens to petition administrative
agencies to institute rulemaking proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). It also requires federal agencies to provide public notice of proposed rulemaking
actions and guarantees interested persons an opportunity to participate in rulemaking
proceedings. Id. § 553(b). Most environmental statutes provide additional protections
for public participation. For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires that states administering federally delegated hazardous waste programs must
provide public participation requirements at least as generous as those available under
federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). The Toxic Substances Control Act authorizes citizens to petition the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
institute certain rulemaking actions and permits citizens to obtain de novo review in federal court if their petition is denied. See 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (1982).
46. See Ruckelshaus, The Citizen and the Environnental Regulatopy Process, 47 IND. L. J.
636 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982); Toxic Substances Control
Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(2), 16 U.S.C.
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morals legislation, contemporary citizens can initiate direct legal action to ensure that the environmental laws are implemented and
enforced.
Yet these provisions rarely result in effective input from the
general public in the development of environmental regulations.4 8
Public participation in the regulatory process has been confined
largely to the affected industries and a handful of national environmental groups. Industries affected by environmental regulations
have every incentive to oppose regulatory action vigorously and to
seek variances, delays, and extensions of regulatory requirements.4 9
Because key decisions are made by "low visibility decisionmakers
fearful of making controversial choices,"" ° administrative agencies
often implement ambitious statutory requirements slowly, inadequately, or not at all.
The lack of effective public participation reflects in part the
complexity and lack of visibility of the regulatory process. Environmental regulations can be awesomely complex and the process that
produces them is a mystery to the average citizen. Regardless of
their good intentions, environmental officials are chronically handicapped by inadequate resources for translating ambitious laws into
effective policy. Legislatures are far more adept at imposing responsibilities on regulatory agencies than they are at appropriating
the resources necessary for carrying them out.
The failure of administrative agencies to implement the environmental laws with the speed and vigor demanded by Congress has
§ 1540(g) (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
48. Private interests have assumed such an important role in the development and
implementation of regulatory policy that our system of administrative law has been described as conforming to an "interest representation" model. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1722-23 (1975). Although the
private interests depicted in the "interest representation" model include influential publicinterest groups, the latter do not have the resources to participate in all regulatory
decisions. See Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation,
47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 233, 237-39 (1984). Thus, in many instances the primary
private input into a regulatory decision comes from the regulated industry.
49. This is not meant as a pejorative statement concerning the behavior of industries
affected by regulatory decisions. Affected industries generally oppose regulation not because they enjoy damaging the environment, but because such regulation costs them
money.
50. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Aclt, 30
UCLA L. REv. 740, 753-54 (1983). While Schoenbrod's observation specifically addressed the problems of state implementation of the Clean Air Act, it can be applied
more generally.
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produced increasingly specific, and increasingly demanding, environmental legislation. When the gap between ambitious statutory
directives and the reality of their inadequate implementation is exposed to public view, outbursts of public concern predictably follow. 5 I The failings of environmental agencies are condemned with
the same vehemence that would have fallen upon those who publicly
flouted official morality in nineteenth-century America. 52 The typical legislative response to such concerns has been to impose new
and more specific statutory requirements for action by administrative agencies.53 But when agencies fail to perform statutory directives, it has proved to be very difficult for the courts to stimulate
agency action. 5 4 And while more specific statutory requirements ultimately may help stimulate agencies to act, they do nothing to improve the quality of agency decisionmaking.5 5
Environmental regulations that have significant impact may be
vulnerable to judicial attack. As noted in the articles that follow,
recent Supreme Court decisions5 6 have raised the prospect that cer51. For example, in June of 1986, the Washington Post published a front-page story
documenting widespread noncompliance with National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits and lax enforcement of the Clean Water Act in the Chesapeake
Bay region. Churchville, The Poisoning of Chesapeake Bay, Wash. Post, June I, 1986, at A l,
col. 1. This article caused a temporary outburst of public concern at a time when Bay
cleanup measures were being widely hailed and helped spur improvements in compliance monitoring and enforcement in the region.
52. See, e.g., Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator. Hazardous WI'aste Policy inthe 1980's, 3
YALEJ. REG. 351 (1986).

53. These requirements increasingly take the form of statutory deadlines for agency
action, accompanied occasionally by "hammer provisions" that specify the details of reg-

ulations that will take effect automatically if the agency fails to meet the deadline. See.
e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7; Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2654 (Supp. IV 1986); Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. I111985). See also
Futrell, Hazardous Wlastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from Superfund, RCRA and Other Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 125, 134-36 (1987); Percival, The Bounds of Consent:
Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 CHI. LEGAL F. 327,
329 & n.8.
54. See Beers, Responses to ]. William Futrell, 24 Hous. L. REV. 148. 150-53 (1987);
Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 97,

98 (1987).
55. One of the few studies that has examined the impact of statutory deadlines on
agency behavior concluded that they have been a crude, but useful, tool for influencing
the speed of the EPA's administrative process. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE,

STATUTORY DEADLINES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION:

NECESSARY BUT NEED

IMPROVEMENT (Sept. 1985). The study noted, however, that EPA had met only 14% of

its statutory deadlines. Id. at ii.
56. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378 (1987) (holding that the government could be liable for the payment of monetary damages as just compensation for even a "temporary taking"); Nollan v. California
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tain environmental regulations, particularly land use controls, may
constitute a taking of private property for which private landowners
must be compensated by the government." As the Supreme Court
recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,5 8 government regulatory action can constitute a taking of private property for which the
fifth amendment demands payment of just compensation if the regulation "goes too far."' 59 Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of the takings concept to our
constitutional notions of fairness, it consistently has refused to declare that regulatory action has "gone too far," even when it caused
substantial economic damage, unless it involved actual physical occupation of private property. 60
Indeed, the Court's decisions last Term confirmed this pattern.
Under facts virtually identical to those of Pennsylvania Coal Co., the
Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 6' refused
to find that a taking had occurred. Also, even as it confirmed that a
damages remedy was available for "temporary takings" in First English EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 6 2 the Court did
not hold that a taking had occurred, but remanded for trial on the
plaintiff's allegation that a regulation had denied it "all use of his
property."16 3 Thus, although First English and Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,64 another taking case that Term, have given new
encouragement to landowners who seek to resist land use regulations, it is doubtful that they have made it any easier to demonstrate
that a taking has occurred.
The current state of taking doctrine actually may reflect a "Victorian compromise" of another sort. Taking doctrine reminds regulators of the importance of respecting constitutional ideals, even
while the Court repeatedly refuses to declare that specific regulaCoastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (holding that the government could not require, without compensation, the granting of an easement over private property to afford physical access to a beach as a condition for approving a permit to build a structure
that allegedly would impair visual access to the beach).
57. See Houck, supra note 15, at 394; Tripp & Oppenheimer, supra note 17. at 448-49.
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. Id. at 415.
60. Compare Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (rejecting taking claims despite enormous economic impact of regulation) and
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (same) uith Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding even minimal
physical occupation of property to be a taking).
61. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
62. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
63. Id. at 2389.
64. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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tions actually constitute taking. Therefore, although the recent decisions may deter government officials from engaging in regulatory
excesses, it is doubtful that they signal the death knell of land use
regulations-which increasingly are being recognized as essential to
65
control nonpoint source pollution.
C. Improving the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulation
Recognizing that decentralized, nonregulatory measures had
failed to stop pollution, Congress established national regulatory
programs to protect the environment. Could the problem be that
this is simply the wrong approach for fighting pollution?
Academic critics have harshly criticized the uniform, technology-based regulations mandated by the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act as inefficient and inflexible.6 6 These critics claim that
more flexible alternatives will provide better environmental protection at less cost. While acknowledging inefficiencies in existing regulatory approaches, others reject the notion that more flexible
alternatives will improve environmental protection, based on experience with current environmental regulations.
Alan Krupnick's article6 8 illustrates the difficulties in using economics to determine "appropriate" levels of environmental protection. Because it is impossible to quantify accurately all the costs and
benefits of measures to protect environmental resources, economics
is less useful in determining overall levels of environmental protection than in assessing the cost-effectiveness of alternative ways to
65. State-wide, comprehensive land use controls appear to be increasingly popular.
See, e.g., Gold, Governor Offers Vermont a Plan on Controlled Growth, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1988, at A14, col. 3.
66. See, e.g., S. BRYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law.
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
67. Howard Latin, for example, maintains that, despite the acknowledged inefficiency of command-and-control regulations, it is doubtful that economically based approaches would achieve better environmental results. He notes that regulatory policy
inevitably must operate in an environment of "pervasive uncertainty, high decisionmaking costs, and manipulative strategic behavior." Latin, supra note 29, at 1270 (footnotes
omitted). Under these circumstances, he argues that the acknowledged inefficiency of
uniform, technology-based standards does not demonstrate their inferiority. Latin argues that economically based regulatory approaches have greater informational costs;
are less predictable, less consistent, and less accessible to public scrutiny and participation; are more vulnerable to political manipulation; and produce increased social dislocation and conflict between geographic areas. id. at 1271.
68. Krupnick, Reducing Bay Nutrients: An Economic Perspective, 47 MD. L. REV. 452
(1988).
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reach predetermined environmental protection goals. Dr. Krupnick
explores various measures for improving the cost-effectiveness of
the 40 percent nutrient reduction goal for the Chesapeake Bay; He
recognizes the enormous complexities of designing a method for
distributing nutrient load reductions that is not only efficient but
also equitable and effective.
Welfare economics provides powerful support for government
regulation to protect the environment.6 9 Aside from a tiny group
who oppose any governmental intervention in the marketplace,
most economists recognize that "common property and other
sources of market failure, such as externalities, irreversibilities and
intergenerational issues, frequently necessitate government activity
of some kind to ensure efficient use and allocation of natural resources." 7 ° Thus, environmental regulations can improve the efficacy of resource allocation. Yet proposals to make environmental
regulations more efficient by increasing their flexibility have not
won wide acceptance in environmental policymaking. 7 '
One reason why flexible economic approaches to environmental regulation have not attained greater acceptance is that their proponents have not convinced policymakers that they will improve
levels of environmental protection even as they relax "inefficient"
environmental controls. Environmental groups who have embraced
economics to promote alternatives that have clear environmental
benefits have received a positive response. 7 ' Arguments for greater
flexibility more frequently are perceived, however, as efforts to
73
weaken environmental standards.
69. The classic work usually cited as having laid the foundation for welfare economics is A. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). See also Willey, Book Review, I I
ECOLOGY L.Q. 95, 98 n.9 (1983) (reviewing W. TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE:
AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982)).
70. W.R.Z. Willey, Economic Criteriain Environmental Regulation-Prospects for the 1980's,
64 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 935 (1982).
71. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337.
72. See, e.g., D. ROE, DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS (1984) (describing how the construction

of two coal-fired power plants was successfully opposed by an environmental group that
proposed a more economic and benign environmental alternative). See also Emshwiller,
Power Struggles: Environmental Group, In Charge of Strategy, Is Stressing Economics, Wall St. J.,

Sept. 28, 1981, § 1, at I, col. 1.
73. Experience with the regulatory review process established by the Reagan administration pursuant to Executive Order 12,291 illustrates how opponents of environmental regulations have used economics in a remarkably asymmetric way. Although the
Executive Order provides that regulators shall attempt "to maximize the net benefits to
society" of regulation, Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(c). 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), the
OMB's guiding principle has instead been an antiregulatory approach. Under the Executive Order, cost-benefit analysis is required before major regulations can be promul-
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This does not imply that economists should give up their efforts
to develop more efficient regulatory approaches. But they must be
mindful that values other than efficiency are also important. The
distributional impact of regulatory policy is of vital importance in a
society in which votes are distributed more equally than income.7 4
Thus, proponents of new regulatory approaches must concentrate
on the development of approaches that offer substantial environmental, as well as economic, benefits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The competing interests involved in environmental policy issues sometimes seem so difficult to resolve that they appear to be
antinomies-intractable conflicts or choices seemingly insoluble in
light of existing knowledge. Environmental regulators must wrestle
with competing principles of preservation and access, freedom and
order, innovation and certainty, which are not capable of easy
resolution.
The challenge of protecting the Nation's coasts and estuaries
continually confronts us with such difficult questions: Can public
policy protect critical natural resources while promoting increased
public access to them? Can environmental contamination be prevented before it occurs if its source and impact are not fully understood until after damage is done? Can regulatory policy protect
environmental quality when multiple point and nonpoint sources
gated, but it is not required to repeal such regulations. Thus, in February 1982 the EPA
proposed to repeal limits on the maximum amount of lead additives used in gasoline
without performing any cost-benefit analysis. 47 Fed. Reg. 7812 (1982) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 80) (proposed Feb. 22, 1982). Two years later, however, after the move
to repeal the lead limits had failed, the EPA considered strengthening the standard. The
cost-benefit analysis performed by the EPA demonstrated that more than $1 billion in
net benefits of reduced medical care and automotive maintenance expenses would be
produced annually by virtually eliminating lead from gasoline. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE (Mar. 1984).
Ironically, this is one of the rare examples of the use of cost-benefit analysis to
strengthen environmental regulations.
74. Mark Sagoff has argued that maximization of economic efficiency is not a principle that individuals have adopted for making decisions left to the political process.
Although individuals may seek to maximize their individual self-interest, and economically efficient policies are capable of generating a larger pie for distribution to individuals. individuals make political choices based on a conception of the common interest that
may differ substantially from economic principles of efficiency. See, e.g., Sagoff, We Have
.let the Eaenty and He Is Us or"Conflici and Contradi-tion in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L.
283 (1982): Sagoff, Econonic Theoy and Environmental Law, 79 Mich. L. REV. 1393 (1981).
For a critique of Sagoff's argument and an alternative exploration of why economics has
not had more influence on environmental law, see Farber, supra note 7 1.
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contribute a bewilderingly complex combination of pollutants? Can
critical areas be preserved without interfering with constitutionally
protected property rights?
Despite past disappointments, officials in the Chesapeake Bay
region have strengthened their public commitment to "Save the
Bay" by expanding their unique interstate agreement and pledging
comprehensive and coordinated actions. The articles that follow offer some useful suggestions for turning this "official IOU" into effective policy that bridges the all too frequent gulf between the
promise and product of environmental regulation.

